German Finance Minister Schaeuble claims that he raised the possibility
of a Greek exit to push for an alternative, and he did so with backing of the
Merkel government. He used the threat of a violating the
"irreversible clause" of the EMU Treaty as a cudgel to beat Greek
Prime Minister Tsipras into submission.
It appeared to work. Tsipras has not only agreed
to all the terms he previously called "blackmail", but he agreed to
essentially implement all the earlier agreements since the crisis began and
more.
There is a powerful argument that
believes that Germany crossed an important line. As Wolfgang Manchau wrote in
the Financial Times, "They have destroyed the eurozone as we know it and
demolished the idea of a monetary union as a step towards a democratic
political union...They demoted the eurozone into a toxic fixed exchange-rate
system, with a shared single currency, run in the interests of Germany, held
together by the threat of absolute destitution for those who challenge the prevailing
order."
The conclusion of this argument that
its vindictiveness toward Greece, Germany has asphyxiated the future of the
European Project.
It becomes a German sphere of interest, dictated by its narrow
self-interest. Rather than leading to greater integration over time, by
threatening a Greek exit the from the irrevocable monetary union, it has
rendered EMU into a rigid form of the ERM. It turns the union into an economic
utilitarian exercise.
Manchau and others argue that on
these more narrow terms, a common currency does not work for many of its
members. He
specifically cites Italy and Finland, but others could make the case for many
other members as well.
There are two currents here. First, many of the perma-euro
skeptics find in the Greek drama confirmation of what they have been arguing
for nearly a quarter of a century. Monetary union without fiscal union
does not work, and there is no appetite for fiscal union. The second
current stems from the bias that exaggerates the significance of the latest
data point as if it were the last.
Many of the economic challenges that
European countries face today were not born with the euro but pre-date it. Under the ERM, there were frequent
crises that were resolved by changing the pegs against the German mark.
This adjustment path has been blocked, but without structural reforms, the
adjustment occurs via debt accumulation. In addition, in violation of EU
rules about the magnitude of external imbalance that require an adjustment,
Germany's insistence on pursuing a large current account surplus requires by
definition others to accumulate debt. This is independent of monetary
union.
It seems true, judging from various
press reports, that the recent European meetings have been particularly
acrimonious.
However, this is not really new. The history of summits is replete with
harsh words and all-night meetings. Some argue that the demands put
on the Greek government are unreasonable and are designed to produce regime
change. They claim this introduces a democratic deficit. Yet the
arguments were expressed when Greek Prime Minister Papandreou was pushed out
after proposing a referendum (which Tsipras opposed) in late 2011. It has
been suggested too that European officials forced Berlusconi out of Italy,
which has had three prime ministers since and none directly elected.
To reach the conclusion that the
critics want, they chose to end their story now. We argue that monetary union
is still evolving and that the Greek crisis does not end that process.
Instead, recognizing the strains that have been caused, European officials will
seek to heal the apparent fissures. We think it is politically
naive to expect Europe's elite to simply give up on the European Project.
There might have been a Plan B for Greece, but there is not one for Europe.
The European Project dates back to
efforts after WWII to avoid another ruinous war in Europe. The way to do it is to form a
community and integrate the economies like never before. While the timing
of monetary union, and the form it took, was a result of specific historic
conditions (e.g. the fall of the Berlin Wall), it was consistent with, and
extended Europe's evolutionary path.
Manchau and others argue the
acrimony, and Germany's pursuit of narrow nationalist self-interest, mark the
end of the road.
More likely, it is not. While it is unlikely to happen immediately,
we expect there to be a strong effort, led by Germany and France, to push for greater
integration. Monetary union is not complete. The banking union is
incomplete. The recent Five Presidents' Report offers an interesting
blueprint and is an expression of the recognized need at the highest levels to
continue to deepen and broaden integration.
It is incumbent on the critics to
explain the future of a non-integrated Europe.
Is it a resumption of tribal warfare? Is real per capita income going be
higher or lower for most Europeans if they return to national currencies?
What is the future of a handful of relatively small countries, with aging
populations, in a world dominated by the likes of the United States, China, and
India? Integration, of course, has problems and challenges, but so
does the opposite. Ultimately, we find much wisdom in Benjamin Franklin's
framing of the issue to the thirteen original colonies on the eastern seaboard
of North America: "Hang together or hang separately."
disclaimer
Greece and the Future of Europe
Reviewed by Marc Chandler
on
July 14, 2015
Rating: