The Great Financial Crisis has exposed a deep chasm in economics and economic policy. No single institution is this crystallized more than at the Bank of Japan.
The former
Governor, Shirakawa brought policy rates to nearly zero to combat deflation. His successor, Kuroda, took the central bank in the
completely other direction. He has introduced three elements of unconventional
policy in an institution that was wedded to orthodoxy.
These include
an aggressive expansion of the central bank's balance sheet through asset
purchases. The assets being purchased are of greater risk than what
other central banks bought,
(including equities and REITs). Most recently the central bank introduced a
negative deposit rate on what appears to be a modest amount of reserves
(<20%).
The contrast between Shirakawa and Kuroda is great
and has proved frustrating for the bureaucrats and technocrats that play such an
important role in the central bank. The Japanese are well aware that the
root of Shirakawa means white, and the
root of Kuroda means black. The same drama is being played out in Europe.
Philosophically, the Bundesbank is not far from Shirakawa's position, while the
majority of the ECB is more similar to Kuroda. Even though Draghi quickly reversed
the two rate hikes introduced by his predecessor, the contrast with Trichet was
not as great as seen in Japan. Trichet did initiate a sovereign bond buying program, liberalized collateral
rules, oversaw ECB loans to Greece.
In many ways, the divide is a recapitulation of the
debate between Hayek and Keynes. Shirakawa and German ordoliberalism does not seem far from
Hayek's position. The active monetarism of Kuroda is consistent with
Keynesian thought and is cut of the same cloth as Draghi's suit.
The great Chinese
pragmatist Deng Xiaoping famously noted that it does not matter if the cat is
black or white as long as it catches mice. Therein lies the rub for Japan. Neither the white cat nor the black cat has caught mice. Neither
Shirakawa's monetary restraint nor Kuroda's aggressive activism has succeeded
in defeating deflation, putting the economy on more solid footing, or providing incentives for the government
reduce the mountain of sovereign debt, which is now surpassing 225% of GDP.
One cannot help
but wonder if the Bundesbank President Weber had replaced Trichet rather than
Draghi, would inflation be closer to the ECB's target. Would unemployment be lower? Would the northern
creditor nations be more willing to recycle their surplus by buying the bonds
of the southern debtor countries? Most would likely answer these
questions in the negative.
Nevertheless,
whatever approach a central bank takes, it can be criticized for failing to
deliver the goods. Shirakawa was criticized, and Abe may not be
able to find a more un-Shirakawa successor than Kuroda. Although
Kuroda has not produced better results, the Bank of Japan's balance
sheet, at nearly 80% of GDP is more than three-times larger than the Federal
Reserve or ECB's balance sheets. Moreover, it is not simply the size of the balance sheet, but its
composition contains considerable riskier assets than the Fed or ECB. The
BOJ, for example, buys ETFs and REITs.
A defeatism
hangs over Tokyo thick like the smog that hugs Beijing. If the white cat does not catch mice
and the black cat does not catch mice, what can be
done? For those committed to catching mice, there is only
one alternative: Get a different mouse trap.
The biggest
obstacle to doing just that is in the minds of Japanese officials. That is to say ideological
constraint, defeatism, and egos are the main obstacles that stand in the way of
a rejuvenated Japan. Japan has a proud history, a great diversified
economy that is the third largest in the world;
its population is highly educated and skilled. Japan is among the largest international creditors.
What would a
different mouse trap look like? We can sketch out three new arrows for Abe. First, the BOJ ought to re-examine how it is measuring the
economy and the picture it offers policymakers, investors,
and citizens. Consider CPI itself. The current target rate
excludes fresh food. No other country does that. Why not do what
the US and the ECB do and measure the core rate by excluding food and energy.
In addition, due
to demographic and structural factors, rents in Japan have for several years
drifted consistently lower. Owing to Japan's circumstances, it
arguably makes sense to exclude rents from a measure that is to inform policy.
Such a calculation would produce a core CPI measure of about 1.5%.
This is still not the 2% target, but it
is a couple of tenths of a point lower
than the US and close enough to the
target to argue against large risk-taking
experiments like continued rapid growth of the BOJ's balance sheet and negative
interest rates.
The BOJ may be
reluctant to do this because it would be seen
as self-serving and a threat to its credibility. However, there is a compelling economic argument, and
its credibility is undermined by consistently pushing out in time when its
target will be achieved. There is
an interest precedent for something similar.
When Reagan
became the President, the US reported the merchandise trade balance, which was always in deficit, and then
later and separately, it would report the service trade balance, which was
always in surplus. Reagan's innovation was to report them together. Given the growing
service trade, a combined report was more economically accurate. It
made for good politics too because the protectionism that often lurks just
below the surface in the US was on display.
Japan has a shrinking population. A few other countries in Europe also have shrinking
populations. In the years ahead more will. Assuming all else being
equal, a falling population means less output. Economists agree GDP is a flawed
number, and the argument here is not to come up with a replacement, rather what
investors and citizens are ultimately interested in is GDP per capita.
Some Japanese
officials recognize this. However, recognizing it is not good enough. Japan should report
GDP per capita alongside GDP. China has begun reporting its trade figures
in yuan as well as the dollars, and will show its reserves in SDR terms.
In per capita terms, Japan is doing better than most high income countries.
The government needs to show this in their public service campaigns.
Kuroda is worried about the deflation psychology. Overcoming may not
necessarily require buying all the new JGBs. A narrative that challenges
the defeatist psychology.
The second new
arrow is for Abe to return to that which worked before in Japan. Unlike the US and much of Europe, in
the 1960s and 1970s, MITI made certain political-economic
decision to pick and support selected industries, like steel, autos, and
televisions and radios.
Given the
current situation in Japan, three such industries
stand out in which Japan can secure the commanding heights: robotics,
recycling, and geriatrics. Japan is already the leads in use
and development of robots. What would help focus the minds, imaginations,
skills of Japanese people is if there were some bigger goal, like the US-Soviet
race to the moon? Imagine
self-replicating robots, like a 3-D printer than can print other 3-D printers.
Japan has
limited natural resources. However, in the future, it may be
more cost efficient (especially if the externalities of mining are fully taken into account) to get raw
materials from already produced goods. Consider that some cars have 30-40
pounds of rare earths. A ton of cell phones have more gold than a ton of gold ore. Essentially, this apply the experience and
success of the mini-mills in taking market shares from the vertically
integrated steel combines to a larger
scale. Japan can lead in recycling, creating new products from recycled
materials, and making new products that have greater ability to be recycled.
Third, Japan is
simply on the leading edge of demographic changes that will be experienced by
other countries in the coming years. Japan can chose to develop an
absolute advantage in issues of an aging population. These can include,
medicines and medical care, leisure-time activities (and consumption) and
integration into society, even if not part of the market economy.
The first new
arrow is for Japan to adopt metrics that make better sense of what it is
experiencing. Adopting
new metrics requires public education. The second arrow is to return
to a key part of Japan's earlier economic
success Identify a few sectors that can draw on Japan's
human, capital, and knowledge resources. Ideally,
the sectors would be appear to be broad
and linked to trends, like demographics, which
do not change quickly. Support those
sectors formally and informally.
The third arrow
is facilitate a new alignment in Japanese society. On one hand, a major failing of Abenomics is the
lack of meaningful wage growth, despite full employment record corporate
profitability. On the other hand,
Japan is still to hike the retail sales tax, and corporate taxes are being cut.
Abenomics has
it exactly backward. The third arrow is about
facilitating consumption not restraining it. Abe cannot address deficit
and debt issues with a regressive tax on households. Surely the recent
experience bears out the adage that you
can't get blood from a turnip. Abe should change tactic, and
learn from Willie Sutton, who said he robbed banks because that is where the
money was.
Japanese
corporations are sitting with record cash levels. Retained earnings over some average is
hoarding and should be frowned upon by
the government. The BOJ set up its negative interest rate policy so that
it would be adjusted if banks began hoarding cash. Maybe the MOF can take
a page from the BOJ's playbook. Ideally,
Japanese business would use the retained earnings to ensure they can retain a loyal workforce, through higher wages,
or new investment.
However, more
likely they would increase dividends and share buybacks. There
are other policies that can help keep that in check too, if necessary.
The tax code shapes the capital structure of business. In the US,
for example, the tax code favors debt over equity.
Another
initiative that could help boost consumption and inflation is to draw on its
huge reserve stockpile. Japan, with a growing current
account surplus, does not need over a
trillion dollars in reserves. What is the purpose of reserves? They
are to be used in a dire situation.
Japan could use a quarter of its reserves to finance domestic demand.
The technocrat
pushback is that unlike the US, for example, that owns its little more than $60 bln of reserve outright, Japan's reserves,
like China's have been purchased through government obligations. That means that to draw down the reserves would be to leave an
unfunded liability. It would simply
increase Japan's debt by that amount. However, it could reduce the
deficit if the it is successful and sparks a multiplier effect from increased
economic activity that boosts the government's revenues.
We began by recognizing that Japan has
tried austerity of Shirakawa's white cat. And it has tried
Kuroda's aggressive black cat, with no better luck. Yet the battle continues to be waged by the
partisans, pushing for this cat or that. Investors want Abe to come up
with a better mouse trap. It requires a combination of drawing on what
has worked for Japan in the past, as well adopting its metrics and
understanding of the contours of the economy and society in the present, while
identifying future growth areas.
There have been
several times that Abe has made bold moves; calculated initiatives that paid
off. Japan and the Prime Minister are at a fork in the road. One way leads to more of the same.
Some fiscal stimulus and maybe some more QQE. The other way leads
to Abe offering a new narrative, a clear vision of Japan in the 21st century
and new bold initiatives. Staying on a course that does not appear to be
working loses confidence. That is guaranteed. Replacing the
black and white cats with a new mouse trap might actually boost confidence that this time the mouse will be caught.
Disclaimer
Toward a New Mouse Trap
Reviewed by Marc Chandler
on
May 13, 2016
Rating: