Meghan Trainor tells us it is "All About
the Bass." It seems like many reporters and analysts may be
mistaking her lyrics as if it is all about debase, as in currency wars.
The latest surge of currency war stories follow
the unexpected decision by the Bank of Japan to dramatically increase its
Qualitative and Quantitative Easing at the end of October. It
was the same week that the Federal Reserve announced the end of its asset
purchase operations. Since the BOJ's decision, the yen has
depreciated by 8.3%.
There has been little push back from the
international community. Nothing from the G20, the G7 or the US
Treasury. Even South Korean rhetoric has been fairly circumspect.
By a unanimous decision, the central bank left rates on hold a couple
weeks after the BOJ's move. The minutes of the South Korean central bank
showed one member warning that concerns about the weak yen and deflation are
exaggerated. Another recognized that the impact of yen's depreciation on
Korea has been limited.
South Korea did cut rates in October, but this
was before the Bank of Japan's move. After denying the need to
provide broad economic support, the PBOC cut the one-year deposit rate for the
first time in two years. Although the move surprised many investors,
there was little if any doubt that the PBOC was motivated by domestic issues,
including softening inflation and falling house prices.
Like China, monetary policy developments in
emerging Asia is driven primarily by domestic variables. Several
countries, like Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and India were in a
tightening mode but are now seen on hold. Taiwan and Singapore have been
on hold for an extended period. When the monetary stance changes, it will
be because of domestic price pressures and the growth outlook.
Some observers are worried about a repeat of
the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. They argue that that crisis was
precipitated by the depreciation of the yen. At the time, many Asian
countries had dollar liabilities and yen receivables. This mismatch is
not nearly as pronounced now. The reason is that rise of China.
China is the largest trading partner of most of emerging Asia. Ironically,
the close link of the yuan to the US dollar serves to minimize the volatility
of the region's currency mismatch.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, the International
business editor at The Telegraph recognizes that the launch the BOJ's
aggressive monetary policy experiment did not trigger a currency war, despite
many claiming otherwise because the yen was significantly over-valued.
This is not the case anymore, which is why he is worried that "Japan
risks Asian currency war with fresh QE blitz."
Indeed, the OECD's measure of purchasing power
parity shows the yen to be now under-valued by 14.5% against the US dollar.
It is the most under-valued of the major currencies. On the eve of
Abe's election two years ago, the OECD estimated the yen was about 23%
over-valued. By the OECD's reckoning, the yen is the most under-valued in
nearly 30 years.
This may seem to help explain why the
launching of QQE in April 2012 did not spark a currency war, but it does shed
light on why there has been little or no resistance to the BOJ's latest
efforts. Could it be that Japanese exports in volume terms are
roughly flat? Could it be that Japanese businesses are not taking
advantage of the weak yen to boost market share in foreign markets?
Many observers seem to confuse means with
ends. The goal is not a weaker currency to boost exports. The goal is
to stimulate the economy and arrest deflation. It is not a race to
debase, but an effort to provide monetary support for an economy that has
reached the zero bound, and one in which fiscal policy is largely exhausted
(Japan's debt is over 230% of GDP). This was one of the concerns that
Moody's expressed when it cut Japan's debt rate to A1, which is below the
rating agencies assessment of China.
Countries have to be free to pursue the
monetary policy that is required by its domestic economy without being accused
of starting a currency war. Many countries
face slow growth and weak price pressures. They could seek to drive their
currencies lower. This could be a zero-sum exercise if it results
in simply taking the aggregate demand from its trade partners.
Alternatively, countries can respond by stimulating their own domestic demand
via monetary and fiscal policies and structural reforms that boost potential
growth.
All about Debase: Not
Reviewed by Marc Chandler
on
December 02, 2014
Rating: