The country is insisting that its creditors
take a 40% haircut, or it threatens to declare a unilateral moratorium.
Important but self-imposed deadlines are approaching. The country is not
Greece but Ukraine.
The IMF initially insisted that Ukraine reach
terms with its creditors before getting more assistance. However, it
now signals that sticking with its program is more important than striking a
deal with it creditors. If it must default to the latter, but adhere to
the former, assistance will still be forthcoming.
Ukraine and the IMF want the country's $70 bln
of debt to be restructured by the end of the month. The creditors
offer extending maturities and deferring interest payments, but the Ukraine
government is insisting on debt relief. The government claims that debt
relief is the only way to honor the IMF demands, 15.3 bln euro of debt savings
in the next four years, debt to GDP no more than 71% in 2020, and
limiting government financing costs to 10% of GDP in the 2019-2025
period.
The creditors say a haircut is not
necessary. Lowing debt service costs can be achieved via lengthening
maturities and postponing interest payments. The creditors reportedly offered
to extend maturities by up to ten years and temporarily lower some coupon and
principal payments. The creditors also argue Ukraine can draw down its
reserves to pay down its debt. However, Ukraine has passed laws to
prevent this kind of use for reserves.
The Bloomberg consensus anticipates that the
Ukraine economy will contract by 6.75% this year. The government does
not seem particularly optimistic that the structural reforms, which the IMF has
advocated (and recognizes their implementation), will put the country on a strong
and sustainable growth path in the coming years. An underlying challenge
that the IMF reforms do not appear to address is that nearly 60% of the economy
in regarded as unofficial/shadow.
Ukraine and the IMF may reach a staff level
agreement as early as next week. Ukraine's parliament must adopt
three measures, none of which addresses the structure of the economy.
Specifically, two of the measures relate to the independence and structure of
the central bank. The third involves the ability of the state oil and gas
monopoly to collect receivables.
The IMF has a procedure for "lending into
arrears" when a country has defaulted to its creditors but adheres to the
IMF's program. The implementation of the IMF's program is a key
factor cited by officials distinguishing Ukraine's case from Greece's.
There are a few other differences too. Greece's primary foreign creditors
are officials, not the private sector as is the case of Ukraine. Tax
payers money was used to lend directly to Greece (EU and EU governments) to try
to contain the crisis and limit the contagion, or to buy Greek bonds from the
private sector (ECB).
Another difference, of course, is that the
geo-strategic importance of Ukraine is obvious. Russia annexed Crimea
and is fostering the breakaway movement in east Ukraine. The humanitarian
crisis in Ukraine is more intuitive than the one that the Syriza government
claims is the case in Greece. While basic services like electricity
have been threatened in some parts of Ukraine due to the insurgency, a couple
hundred thousand in Greece reportedly do not have access to electricity because
they cannot afford it. We have
argued that Greece’s geo-strategic importance is significant and has often been neglected
by analysts.
At the end of next week (June 20) Ukraine owes
Russia a roughly $75 mln payment to service the 3 bln Eurobond Russia
holds. That bond matures later this year, but Russia is claiming
senior creditor status (like the EU sovereigns and, even more so, the IMF, claim
for themselves). It refuses to negotiate with Ukraine over debt relief.
Perhaps the key difference is that after a 25%
contraction in the Greek economy (in real terms), a doubling of unemployment and 11% cut in
government payrolls (2011-2013), the social and political fabric has
broken. With deflation gripping the economy, the nominal economy has
imploded. The election of Syriza (that garnered a little more than a
third of the vote) itself reflects that breakdown. It is not just
about this or that personality in the Syriza government or some of the petty
issues that have been aired. The official sector cut off aid to Greece
six months before Syriza was elected.
The Syriza government is often called radical,
but it agrees with many critics in the private sector that the "extend and
pretend" strategy that the official creditors are insisting on is futile
and ultimately destructive. The IMF has argued for debt relief, but
it has not pressed hard and is very generous with European (taxpayer) money but
refuses to lead by example.
Ukraine and Greece: Compare and Contrast
Reviewed by Marc Chandler
on
June 11, 2015
Rating: