It is a bit too familiar, isn't it? Greece received a new loan
so it can service its debt to the official creditors. In exchange for the
funds, of which practically none stay in Greece, the government has promised to
carry out the reforms that the past few governments had agreed to but failed to
implement. Greece may no longer be in arrears to the IMF, but it is
making ends meet by delaying payments to local service providers.
Last week, the Greek parliament approved the list of what the creditors
call "prior actions," committing the Greek government to those past
reforms. Tomorrow parliament will vote on two other measures; the
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and a bill that modernizes the
judicial system. These measures are less controversial than
last week's, but a few more Syriza MPs are likely to defect.
The BRRD is an important measure that will eventually be enacted
throughout Europe. It allows senior bondholders and depositors to bear the cost of a failed financial institution before taxpayers money
will be used. Many countries have not passed the directive. In May,
the EC gave Italy, France, and nine others EU countries two months to approve
BRRD.
In Greece's case, invoking these measures may be counterproductive.
With the banks re-opening for the first time in three weeks, and capital
controls still in place, confidence in the financial system is poor. Many
are fearful that one way or the others, depositors are at risk of either a tax
or confiscation of deposits over the 100k euro insurance threshold. This
fear encourages deposit flight, and in turn, prevents the lifting of capital
controls.
Greek deposits have fallen by 34 bln euros since last October.
Many of those with the means to set up offshore accounts have probably done
so. There is much precedent (not only in Cyprus but in the US too) of not
protecting deposits beyond the insurance level.
However, in Greece's case, this would likely hurt small and medium size
Greek businesses that have their working capital in the banks. The
contracting economy, the bank holiday, the capital controls and the
government's tardiness in paying its service providers are already hurting
Greek businesses. Although current hard data is not available, one must
assume that business loans are souring. Taking from the same business their working
capital via deposits in excess of 100k would only aggravate the
situation.
Note that there are important differences between US deposit insurance
and Greece's. First the US FDIC insurance applies to each account,
not to each depositor. In the US, a depositor can have more than one
account. Each account is insured. In Greece, the depositor is
insured and with a lower ceiling than in the US. Second,
during the crisis, the US offered unlimited insurance for non-interest bearing
transaction accounts, which are used for working
capital.
These would be two innovations that could be useful in Greece.
The purpose of which is not so much to help those who have as it is to increase
the likelihood of success. Bailing in depositors, including those
with an excess of 100k euros could do more economic and financial harm than
good.
What about shareholders? Surely they should be liquidated as
part of the recapitalization efforts, for which some 25 bln euros of a new aid
package will be earmarked. However, while the principle is right,
the application in Greece is suspect. The top four banks in Greece
account for 90% the industry. Two of the banks (Piraeus and Alpha) are
2/3 owned by the government and a third (National Bank of Greece) is owned 57%
by the government. The only one of the top four banks that the government
does not have a majority ownership stake is Eurobank (35%).
Given these circumstances, liquidating shareholders would reverberate
back onto taxpayers. It would not be particularly helpful in
disciplining the owners. It would likely complicate efforts to
recapitalize the banks. It may be more fruitful to consider consolidation
as part of the recapitalization process.
Some measures that the creditors have demanded from Greece are narrow and
petty, like opening up shops on Sunday. However, some demands seem to
be more generally beneficial for Greece. For example, as part of the
"prior actions" reforms approved last week, Greece agreed to make its
national statistics office independent. This cannot simply be dismissed
as a function of Greece becoming a vassal state. Similarly, the reforms
that will be voted on tomorrow include modernizing and making more efficient
the Greek judicial system. This will cut the time and costs of civil
action. Renzi has pushed for similar reforms in Italy.
Last week's parliament vote saw 38 Syriza MPs vote against the
government. Those cabinet officials that failed to support the
government were replaced. Local press reports suggest another handful of
Syriza MPS are likely to dissent tomorrow. The bills will still
pass, and by a wide margin. The problem is that it weakens the
government.
Recall Syriza had 149 seats in the 300-member chamber. Its
junior coalition member has 13 seats, giving the government 162 MPs. Given the
dissents last week, if more than four defect tomorrow, the government's support
would fall below 120, which is seen as making it problematic to govern. This is
what is fueling speculation of an election later this year.
It is possible, and even likely, that Syriza returns to government in a
new election. A newspaper poll put Syriza's support at 42.5%, nearly
twice the support of New Democracy, which is in second place at
21.5%. However, the problem with an election is that it may
delay the formal review of Greece's actual implementation of the measures it
has promised. That in turn would delay the debt relief that now even
Merkel has accepted as necessary and inevitable.
disclaimer
What's Next for Greece?
Reviewed by Marc Chandler
on
July 21, 2015
Rating: