In our work, we have argued that the dollar is having its third significant rally since the end of Bretton
Woods. The first rally was associated with Reagan though it began under Carter and followed
100 bp hike by a new Federal Reserve Chairman (Volcker).
On a real broad trade-weighted
basis, the dollar appreciated by more than 50% over the seven years and in
1985, the G7 met at the Plaza Hotel in NY and agreed to coordinate intervention to drive the dollar down.
Before last month's G20 meeting, some had talked about the possibility of
another Plaza-like agreement. We downplayed such suggestions.
There was no appetite for intervention. Many countries are still easing
monetary policy, and typically central banks want their currencies to move in
the same direction as monetary policy. Otherwise, the foreign exchange
market would dilute the impact of the easier policy.
We also argued that ideologically, the US and Europe could not press
China (and others) to allow market mechanisms to drive foreign exchange prices,
and then intervene when they did like what the markets had done. With
the notable exception of the intervention after the Japan's tsunami and nuclear
accident, there was not G7 intervention in the foreign exchange market in
recent years. Even during the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC),
the G7 did not intervene. Swap lines between central banks provided
access to the needed dollar funding.
In addition, the dollar's strength
is generally understood to be part of the
solution, not the problem. The US responded relatively early and
aggressively to the GFC. It asset purchases began in 2009. The ECB
and BOJ begin their programs several years later, for example. A weaker
euro and weaker yen are part of the solution not part of the
problem.
Nevertheless, some observers are arguing that there was a secret G20
agreement to stop the dollar from rising. Leave aside the fact
that euro made its low a year ago (16 March 2015) near $1.0460.
Leave aside the fact that the dollar fell almost 9% against the yen in the two
weeks prior to the G20 meeting.
Leave aside the fact that G20 officials have repeatedly denied such conspiracy
theories.
The secret agreement was to "roughly stabilize the dollar versus the
major currencies through appropriate monetary policy action, not through
intervention." However, consider what has happened
since the G20 meeting. The PBOC cut reserve requirements. The ECB
not only cut rates deeper into negative territory
but accelerated and broadened its asset purchases. The Bank of Japan cut
rates into negative territory for the first time before the G20 meeting.
Although it left rates on hold this week, the BOJ is expected to ease policy
further as early as next month. Norway cut interest rates and warned that negative rates should not
be ruled out. New Zealand also cut interest rates and indicated lower
rates may still be needed.
It is true that the Fed scaled back the four rate hikes it had
anticipated in December for 2016. However, the market never had
discounted that scenario. As US economic data strengthened in recent
weeks, and the fear of recession subsided, and energy prices rose, the pendulum
of expectations swung back from not pricing in a single hike to pricing in
nearly two. Between the G20 meeting and this week's FOMC meeting,
the market priced in an increased likelihood of a June rate hike.
What about the yuan? The dollar peaked, at least thus far, on 8
January near CNY6.5960. Chinese officials, long before the G20
meeting, took steps to stabilize the yuan. The PBOC fixed the yuan 0.5%
higher today, the most since November. The dollar was at its lowest level
since the second half of last December today. For the record, more of the yuan gains took place before the
G20 meeting than afterward. Also, Chinese officials have repeatedly said
they do not seek a large devaluation. They reiterated its stance at the
G20 meeting.
The focus on intervention this week has been in Japan. The sharp recovery of the dollar after spiking
down to nearly JPY110.65 yesterday sparked talk of BOJ intervention. We
are skeptical. First, given the criticism of Japan at the G20 meeting and
the fact that there has not been G7 intervention, the bar to BOJ action is very
high. Second, intervention outside of Tokyo is diplomatically more
complicated. Our understanding is that it is customary for a central bank
to request permission to intervene in another central bank's markets.
Formally, this would have required Federal Reserve, and likely the US Treasury
(where the onus of dollar policy resides).
Third, if the BOJ would have actually
intervened there would be not doubt of its presence. Someone
would confirm having transacted with it. Fourth, since the FOMC meeting,
it has not been a yen move, but a dollar move. This too would have dissuaded the BOJ for intervening. Fifth,
unilateral BOJ intervention has a poor track record of success.
Coordinated intervention has a somewhat better track record.
We suspect that rather than celebrating the success of the secret
Plaza-like Agreement, officials are just as surprised and discombobulated as
investors by the market action. In our conversations with various officials, we do not get the sense that the
rise of the yen, euro, and dollar-bloc currencies is wholly desired. To the extent that many countries are
wrestling with deflation or lowflation, the rise in commodity prices, the more
than 40% rise in oil prices since mid-January (a month before the G20 meeting),
may be welcomed.
The Reagan dollar rally was driven by the
policy mix. Reagan had his foot on the fiscal
accelerator. Volcker had his foot on the monetary brake. This
policy mix is the best for a currency.
It is the same policy mix (and roughly of the same magnitude of GDP) as
German's policy mix after the Berlin Wall fell, leading to the uber-mark
overshoot of the early 1990s). The Obama dollar rally is driven by the divergence of monetary
policy.
Despite the dovish read of the FOMC, the fact of the matter is that it
anticipates two hikes this year still. This is hardly dovish though
it is less hawkish. The ECB's large policy measures earlier
essentially take them out of the picture for Q2, and probably Q3 as well.
The impact of the current measures needs
to be studied. The rise of commodity prices buys some time too.
Nevertheless, the ECB is still easing policy. The BOJ may ease again in Q2, and its asset purchase program continues
unabated.
Monetary divergence has not peaked, and although there is not a
one-to-one correspondence with the foreign exchange market, which has other
influences and subject to contradictory impulses, over time it is likely to underpin the dollar. Provided the
rise is orderly, which means occasional setbacks, the dollar's rise is unlikely
to spur an international agreement, secret or otherwise.
Lastly, we have noted the temporal inconsistencies of central bankers; we recognize the same in the
market. The Fed funds futures market has swung from no chance of a
single hike this year in the US to increased chances of two (before the FOMC
meeting). The market has swung from the US
is likely headed for a recession to slow
but trend-like growth is set to continue. We have argued against the
currency war and race-to-the-bottom narrative that was popular in the
press. Now many are swinging hard in the opposite direction. There
is a secret agreement to prop up the other major currencies and depress the
dollar. Be skeptical.
Disclaimer
Thoughts on Conspiracy Theories of the Dollar's Losses
Reviewed by Marc Chandler
on
March 18, 2016
Rating: