The conventional narrative is that a wave of
populism-nationalism is a sweep in the US
and Europe. This is not as
obviously true as many seem to think. The most likely scenario is that in
the three European elections this year, that the populist-nationalists do not
succeed in being part of, let alone leading governing coalition.
The actual success of populism-nationalism in
the UK and US was a function of the
center-right parties adopting the populist-nationalist agenda. No
populist party won in the US and UK. In the UK, the Tories promised a
non-binding referendum on EU membership
and then embraced the narrow result as if it were binding. In the US, the
Republican Party at first resisted, but then capitulated to at least parts of
Trump's agenda. In Europe, the center-right parties are running against
the populist-nationalists.
While the two-party systems in the US and UK
may have helped facilitate a victory for (at least part) of the
populist-nationalist agenda, the multi-party systems in Europe are a
check. This will be
particularly clear in next week's Dutch election. There are more
than two dozen Dutch political parties,
and an almost half may be represented in the next parliament.
The current parliament seats 11 parties. The threshold is low. A
party only needs 0.66% of the vote to secure a seat. This suggests another dimension to
democracy.
The Dutch Parliament has 150 members.
No party is likely to secure more than 30 seats. The fragmented
parliament means that what the British call a hung parliament is normal in the
Netherlands. The next government is likely to require the cooperation of
four or five political parties.
The fragmentation and need for coalitions force compromise and acts as a check on
innovative or bold changes. In recent years, the old centrist parties have
seen their fortunes erode. The main three parties used to draw 80% or
more of the vote. Their draw has been
roughly halved.
Many suspect
that economics have something to do with the appeal of the
populist-nationalist. Whatever that relationship is, it is not
straightforward. The US and UK have performed among the best since the
Great Financial Crisis, and their unemployment is half of what it in the eurozone. The Netherlands also enjoy a
relatively strong economy. Unemployment stood at 5.3% in January, a
five-year low. The economy grew by
0.5% in Q4 16 for a 2.3% year-over-year pace. There were about 30k asylum
seekers last year, a third of what the government had anticipated.
There are five political parties that the
polls suggest could come in first place. Most recently, support
for Wilder's Freedom Party (PVV) has slipped to the benefit of some of the
medium-sized parties. Wilder's is not the first anti-immigration populist
to strike a chord in the Netherlands. Back in 2002, Pim Fortuyn List to
lead his populist party to 26 seats, that he was assassinated by an
environmentalist a little more than a week before the election. No
government was able to form, and a new
election was held in 2003, and the party won only eight seats. In the next election, it did not win any seats.
There are three Dutch conventions that will
shape the next government. First, the party that receives the most
votes should get the first chance to put together a coalition. The
challenge is that Wilder's has organized the PVV,
so he is the only member, and it appears he has gone out of his way to
antagonize the other parties. He will find it difficult if not
impossible to find sufficient coalition partners to form the next government.
Second, the coalition should include two of the three largest
parties. This is not impossible if
the PVV is the party not included. Third, the coalition should include at
least one party that managed to increase the number of seats in
parliament. This too is not a
particularly difficult hurdle.
To the extent that there is a concern about
the election, and one cannot see it in the performance of Dutch assets,
it is the possibility of a referendum on EU or EMU membership. It is
highly unlikely, and talk of Nexit is an exercise in hyperbole. It is
true that the Dutch electorate has not always taken a pro-EU line. They
rejected the EU constitution in 2005 and last year rejected an associate
agreement with Ukraine.
Nevertheless, there is overwhelming support for the EU and the
euro.
Referendums in the Netherlands are rare and
not explicitly grounded in the Constitution. It is advisory only (yes
that is what the UK electorate was told
too). A referendum requires both houses
of parliament to approve the referendum. Last year, after the UK
referendum, Wilders supported a motion calling for a Dutch referendum on EU
membership. It was rejected on a
136-14 vote.
On the one hand,
the defeat of the PVV in the Netherlands
would support our thesis of no nationalist-populist wave sweeping through
Europe, let alone the world. On the other hand, one should not
confuse this defeat with some kind of closure. The populist-nationalist
sentiment appears to be encouraging center-right parties to tack further toward a hardline on immigration,
and stronger law-and-order messages. The centrist parties need to
address the underlying question populism is raising about national identities
and the rights (and responsibilities) of citizens. On top of that is the
future of Europe. Compare Juncker's five scenarios that were recently
released, with the strong commitment of more integration outlined in the Five
Presidents' Report.
Disclaimer
Dutch Election: Where Rubber Meets the Road
Reviewed by Marc Chandler
on
March 08, 2017
Rating: